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 Executive Summary 
 
In February, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change came into force, but without participation by the United States. Its impacts on 
emissions of greenhouse gases — including carbon dioxide (CO2), the primary anthropogenic 
driver of climate change — will be trivial; but scientific and economic analyses point to the need 
for a credible international approach. 
 
Because the Kyoto Protocol’s ambitious targets apply only to the short term (2008-2012) 
and only to industrialized nations, the agreement will impose relatively high costs and generate 
only modest short-term benefits while failing to provide a real solution. For these reasons, most 
economists see the agreement as deeply flawed, although some see it as an acceptable first step. 
Virtually all agree, however, that the Protocol is not sufficient to the overall challenge. 
 
We describe the basic features of a post-Kyoto international global climate agreement, 
which addresses three crucial questions: who, when, and how. The respective elements are: first, 
a means to ensure that key nations — industrialized and developing — are involved; second, an 
emphasis on an extended time path of action (employing a cost-effective pattern over time); and 
third, inclusion of market-based policy instruments. 
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An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era
Sheila M. Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins*
In February, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change came into force, but without participation by the United States.  Its impacts on
emissions of greenhouse gases — including carbon dioxide (CO2) , the primary anthropogenic driver
of climate change — will be trivial; but scientific (Robert T. Watson 2001) and economic analyses
(Charles D. Kolstad and Michael A. Toman 2001) point to the need for a credible international
approach.
Because the Kyoto Protocol’s ambitious targets apply only to the short term (2008-2012) and
only to industrialized nations, the agreement will impose relatively high costs and generate only
modest short-term benefits while failing to provide a real solution (Joseph E. Aldy et al. 2003).  For
these reasons, most economists see the agreement as deeply flawed (Richard N. Cooper 1998; David
G. Victor 2001; Warwick J. McKibbin and Peter J. Wilcoxen 2002), although some see it as an
acceptable first step (Axel Michaelowa 2003).  Virtually all agree, however, that the Protocol is not
sufficient to the overall challenge.
We describe the basic features of a post-Kyoto international global climate agreement, which
addresses three crucial questions:  who, when, and how.  The respective elements are: first, a means
to ensure that key nations — industrialized and developing — are involved; second, an emphasis
on an extended time path of action (employing a cost-effective pattern over time); and third,
inclusion of market-based policy instruments.2
I.  Who — Expand Participation to Include All Key Countries
Broad participation, by major industrialized nations and key developing countries, is
essential to address this global commons problem effectively and efficiently.  Developing countries
are likely to account for more than half of global emissions by 2020, possibly sooner (Nebojsa
Nakicenovic and Robert Swart 2000).  It can be argued, on an ethical basis, that industrialized
countries should take the first steps, since — almost by definition — they are responsible for the
bulk of anthropogenic concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  But two serious
problems remain.  First, developing countries currently provide the greatest opportunities for low-
cost emissions reductions (Watson 2001). Second, if developing countries are not included,
comparative advantage in the production of carbon-intensive goods and services will shift outside
the coalition of participating countries, pushing non-participating nations onto more carbon-
intensive growth paths, increasing their costs of joining the coalition later.
This poses a policy conundrum.  On the one hand, for purposes of environmental
effectiveness and economic efficiency, key developing countries should participate.  On the other
hand, for purposes of distributional equity (and international political pragmatism), they cannot be
expected to incur the consequent costs.  The answer is a set of “growth targets” that are set initially
at business-as-usual (BAU) levels for respective developing countries, but become more stringent
as those countries become more wealthy.  This would be a natural extension of the allocation pattern
in the Kyoto Protocol, where targets for industrialized countries exhibit an income elasticity of
reductions of about 0.10 (Jeffrey A. Frankel 1999).
Initial targets for developing countries could even be set at emissions that are above BAU
levels.  If combined with an international trading program (discussed below), this would provide3
significant economic incentives for participation.  Developing countries could fully participate
without incurring prohibitive (or even any) costs in the short term.  Cost-effectiveness and
distributional equity would both be addressed.
II.  When — Use An Extended Time Path
Global climate change is a long-term problem, because greenhouse gases remain in the
atmosphere for decades to centuries, but the Kyoto Protocol fails to reflect this cumulative, stock-
pollutant nature of the problem.  The Protocol’s short-term targets, an average 5 percent reduction
from 1990 levels by the 2008–2012 compliance period, may sound modest, but they translate into
severe 25–30 percent cuts for the United States from its BAU path, because of the rapid economic
growth the country enjoyed during the 1990s, amounting to a 37 percent increase in real gross
domestic product (GDP).
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol’s targets are too little, too fast:  they do little about the problem,
but are unreasonable for countries that experienced significant economic growth post-1990.  Two
elements will ameliorate this problem:  moderate targets in the short term to avoid rendering large
parts of the capital stock prematurely obsolete, and more stringent targets for the long term to
motivate (now and in the future) technological change, in order to bring costs down over time.
Targets ought to begin at BAU levels, then depart gradually, so that emissions increase at
first but at rates below BAU.  These targets should reach a maximum level and then decrease —
eventually becoming much more severe than the constraints implied by the Kyoto Protocol’s targets.
This is consistent with estimates of the least-cost time path of emissions for achieving long-term
greenhouse-gas concentration goals (Alan S. Manne and Richard G. Richels 1997).  For example,4
for the frequently-discussed goal of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 at twice pre-
industrial levels, the cost-effective time path of emissions would involve global emissions peaking
in 2030 (Thomas M. L. Wigley et al. 1996).  Of course, the long-term targets should be flexible,
because there is great uncertainty throughout the policy-economics-biophysical system, some of
which will be resolved over time (Richels et al. 2004).
We use the word “target” generically to refer not only to emission targets (as in the Kyoto
Protocol) but also to “intensity targets” — emissions per unit of GDP.  The proposal we offer is also
consistent with a time-path of targets denominated in financial units, such as carbon prices (taxes
on the carbon content of fossil fuels).  In any event, this time path of targets — put in place now —
would also be consistent with what is often denigrated as “politics as usual.”  Politicians in
representative democracies are frequently condemned because there are incentives to place greater
costs on future, not current voters.  It is typically the politically pragmatic strategy.  In the case of
global climate policy, it may also be the scientifically correct and economically rational approach.
III.  How — Employ Market-Based Policy Instruments
All observers agree that conventional regulatory approaches cannot do the job, certainly not
at acceptable costs.  To keep costs down in the short term and bring them down even lower in the
long term through technological change, it is essential to embrace market-based instruments.
On a domestic level, systems of tradable permits might be used to achieve national targets.
This approach was used in the United States to phase out leaded gasoline in the 1980s at a savings
of more than $250 million per year over an equivalent traditional regulatory approach (Robert N.
Stavins 2003), and is now used to cut sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions from power plants by half, at5
an annual cost savings of $1 billion (A. Denny Ellerman et al. 2000).  The better policy model for
climate change is the upstream lead-rights system (analogous to trading on the carbon content of
fossil fuels), rather than the downstream SO2 emissions-trading system.
For some countries, systems of domestic carbon taxes may be more attractive, and a
particularly promising approach is a hybrid of tax and tradable-permit systems — an ordinary
tradable permit system, plus a government promise to sell additional permits at a stated price
(McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002; William A. Pizer 2002).  This addresses cost uncertainty by creating
a price (and thereby cost) ceiling, and has hence been labeled a safety-valve approach.
International policy instruments are also required, and the Kyoto Protocol includes a system
whereby the parties to the agreement can trade their “assigned amounts” — their national reduction
targets — translated into emissions terms.  In theory, such a system of international tradable permits
— if implemented only for the industrialized countries (as in the Protocol) — could reduce costs by
50 percent.  If such a system were to include major developing countries as well, costs could be
lowered to 25 percent of what they otherwise would be (James A. Edmonds et al. 1997).
A theoretical attraction of an international trading approach is that the equilibrium allocation
of permits, the market-determined permit price, and the aggregate costs of abatement are
independent of the initial allocation of permits among countries.  This is only true if particularly
unlikely types of transaction costs are not prevalent and individual parties — be they nations or
firms — are not able to exercise market power.  The latter concern is a real one in the climate policy
context.  If, for example, the majority of excess permits (allowable emissions in excess of BAU
emissions) is found in a relatively small number of nations, then the possibility increases of
collusion among sellers (Manne and Richels 2004).  Furthermore, an international trading system6
must be designed to facilitate integration with domestic policies, because individual nations’ choices
of domestic policy instruments can substantially limit the cost-saving potential of an international
system (Robert W. Hahn and Stavins 1999).
In any event, the initial allocation of permits among nations can imply exceptionally large
international wealth transfers.  Several analysts have identified this as a major objection to an
international carbon trading regime, and have endorsed international tax approaches for this and
other reasons (Cooper 1998; McKibbin and Wilcoxen 2002; Pizer 2002; Richard G. Newell and
Pizer 2003; and William D. Nordhaus 2005).  Many of the objections are well-founded, but it is the
wealth-transfer feature of the permit approach that allows cost-effectiveness and distributional
equity to be addressed simultaneously.
IV.  Conclusions
The three-part global climate policy architecture we propose can form the foundation for a
successor to the Kyoto Protocol.  For such an approach to work, key nations must be involved,
including major developing countries through the use of economic trigger mechanisms such as
growth targets.  In addition, cost-effective time paths of targets are required:  firm, but moderate in
the short term, and in the long term, much more stringent yet flexible.  Finally, market-based policy
instruments ought to be part of the package, whether emissions trading, carbon taxes, or hybrids of
the two.
A premise of our proposal is that the global commons nature of the climate problem requires
a multinational — if not fully global — approach.  As long as global marginal benefits exceed every
nation’s own marginal benefits, countries will either want to avoid participating or avoid complying7
fully if they do participate.  Successful international cooperation must change these incentives (Scott
Barrett and Stavins 2003).  Can countries credibly commit to the long-term program that is part of
this proposed architecture?  Our answer is that once nations have ratified the agreement,
implementing legislation within respective nations would translate the agreed long-term targets into
domestic policy commitments.  And once such implementing legislation was enacted, signals would
thereby be sent to private industry, which would begin to take action.  Ultimately, such domestic
actions provide the signals that other countries need to see.  This represents a logical and ultimately
feasible chain of credible commitment.
This overall approach can be made to be scientifically sound, economically rational, and
politically pragmatic.  There is no denying that the challenges facing adoption and successful
implementation of this climate policy architecture are significant, but they are no greater than the
challenges facing other approaches to the threat of global climate change.
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